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I. Introduction
The principle aims to be achieved by financial liberalization in
financially repressed developing countries are to increase the
volume of investments and to improve their allocative efficiency.
The theoretical and empirical literature stresses the importance
of raising real interest rates in countries .with interest rate
ceilings and permanently or at least temporary negative real in-
terest rates . This reform proposal is based on the expectation
that higher real interest rates would induce private households
to save more in the commercial banking system, thereby enabling
financial institutions to expand their credit supply to private
firms. Assuming that private investments were constrained by the
non-availability of credit before the financial reform was im-
plemented, those firms are supposed to increase their real capi-
2
tal formation .
The empirical evidence confirms at least for Asian developing
countries that financial savings do indeed increase in response
to higher real interest rates (Corsepius, Fischer, 1987a). How-
ever, some authors (Roe, 1986; Snowden, 1987) refer to the ex-
periences with financial liberalization in Chile and Turkey and
question the desirability of higher interest rates from a firm-
specific perspective. According to their reasoning, higher inter-
est rates for bank credits squeeze the profitability of private
firms, thus largely offsetting the positive impact of the in-
creased availability of bank credit.
* Financial support of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and helpful
comments of B. Fischer are gratefully acknowledged.
For a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, see
Fischer (1982), Fry (1982) and Gupta (1984).
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Among the problems which are excluded by this assumption are
the impact of extensive regulation of commercial banks and the
flow of funds between formal and informal financial markets on
the volume of the loanable funds. Furthermore, other options
for commercial banks, such as government or foreign securities,
could be considered rather than to lend additional funds to
private companies. For further theoretical considerations, see
Corsepius (1986) and Galbis (1986).In order to evaluate the validity of the above outlined criticism
this article tries to shed some light on the relationship between
interest rate reform and private capital formation using data
from Peru. The next section discusses whether interest rates
necessarily have to increase for borrowers if interest rates on
deposits are raised. Assuming that interest for bank credits
increase, the third section uses a theoretical model to show how
total interest payments for private firms change. The first part
of the fourth section deals with the question whether different
means to raise real interest rates, i.e. lowering inflation or
raising nominal interest rates, are symmetric in their impact on
private capital formation. To capture the impact of lowering
inflation on private real capital formation, in the second part
of section four an investment model incorporating inflation ef-
fects is tested econometrically with Peruvian data. The final
section provides some tentative policy conclusions with respect
to an appropriate policy mix for financial reforms.
II. Implications of Higher Deposit Rates for Interest Rates on
Bank Credit
Several arguments can be put forward why increases in deposit
rates need not imply higher interest rates for bank credits. In
financially repressed economies with interest rate ceilings and
segmented credit markets banks are often able to expand the
spread between the interest rate on deposits and for credits
above the competitive equilibrium value . In particular, they
tend to stick to the ceilings for deposits but evade interest
rate controls for loans. The effective interest rate paid by
firms is increased through compensating balances or discounting
of credits (Fry, 1982). Inefficient intermediation, i.e. exces-
sive operating costs, or monopoly profits are the consequences.
Thus, measures to increase competition in the banking sector may
set enough resources free to finance higher interest rates on
deposits.
See, for example, the case of the banking sector in Thailand
(Corsepius, Fischer, 1987b).In order to assess the magnitude in which more efficient inter-
mediation can finance higher deposit rates Peruvian data are em-
ployed. Intermediation costs are measured by calculating the
ratio of operating costs to total assets over the period 1978-80.
The data are derived from balance sheets and the consolidated
income account of the commercial banking system . This yields a
value of 5.6% for Peru compared to 4.4% for Colombia and 2.4% for
Thailand (Rocha, 1986). In addition, the ratio of profits before
tax to total assets was in 1981 2.1% in Peru but only 1.3% (1980)
in Colombia and 1.5% (1980) in Thailand. These figures suggest
that the Peruvian banks have earned relatively high profits while
being comparatively cost-intensive. To arrive at a benchmark
estimate for potential efficiency gains, it is optimistically
assumed that a financial reform succeeds in cutting operating
costs and profits by half. In the case of the three largest pri-
vate commercial banks this would have freed enough resources to
increase interest rates for existing time and saving deposits on
average by 7.4 percentage points during the years 1978-80 and 4.2
percentage points in 1984-85. Considering, however, that the
effective ex-post real interest rate on saving accounts was on
average -42.9% in the period 1978-80 and -45.0% in 1984-85, even
drastic improvements in the intermediation efficiency would alone
not have been sufficient to finance positive ex-post real inter-
est rates on existing deposits.
Besides operating costs and profits, other main determinants of
the spread between interest rates for deposits and credits are
taxes, legal reserve requirements and obligations to lend at
preferential rates to certain groups of borrowers. Abstracting
from costs and profits and assuming that no interest is earned on
legal reserves, the required interest rate spread increases pro-
2
portionally with the reserve requirement . For example, during
The commercial banking system includes: Private and public
- commercial banks, regional banks, savings banks. For the data
see Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros, Memoria, various is-
sues.
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The loan rate required to cover the costs of all deposits
equals: •
(Deposit rate)/(1-Reserve Requirement).1978-80 in Peru the weighted average interest rate paid on depo-
sits in national currency was 11.6%, while the average basic
reserve requirement was 49.1% over the same period. Thus, the
average loan rate necessary to cover interest payments on depo-
sits would have been 22.8%.
The effects of portfolio restrictions, which require banks to
invest in low yielding government securities or extend credits to
certain borrowers at preferential interest rates, are similar to
those of reserve requirements. However, since banks earn some
interest on those funds, their impact on spreads is smaller such
as in those cases where some interest is paid on reserves
(Hanson, 1986).
In sum, deregulation of the banking sector and efficiency gains
through increased competition will provide banks with substantial
resources. These can be used to finance higher deposit rates
while keeping lending rates constant. However, as operating costs
can only be reduced gradually over time, in the short-run some
increase in credit interest rates may be inevitable. Whether
higher interest rates for bank credits imply an increasing total
interest burden for investment financing of private firms is
analyzed in the next section.
III. Raising Interest Rates for Bank Credit and the Interest
Costs for Private Firms
In developing countries with financial repression private firms
borrow in the formal as well as in the informal credit market.
Average interest costs for all firms are, therefore, a weighted
average of interest rates in both markets. How a rise in interest
rates for bank credit affects average interest costs, depends on
the relationship between the informal and the formal credit mar-
ket. Snowden (1987), for example, assumes implicitly that the
credit markets are completely segmented. Thus, the interest rate
and the credit volume in the informal financial sector are not
affected by a financial reform in the formal market. Accordingly,
higher interest rates for bank credits will depress corporateprofits and the ability of firms to accumulate equity through
retentions. However, the plausibility of Snowden's assumption is
disproved by empirical evidence from several countries (Acharya,
Madhur, 1983; Wijnbergen, 1983; Corsepius, Fischer, 1987b). These
studies show that higher interest rates in the banking system
reduce interest rates and the credit volume in the informal
financial sector. Thus, the results support a substitutionary
relationship between both credit markets. Based on this evidence
the following linear model is used to examine whether Snowden's
criticism of financial liberalization still holds:
•qp = a + bip = q (1)
q° = c + diF (2)
g _
<lj = r, a + bi.j. - q (3)
q, = r2 c + dij - q (4)
4-4 (5)
4 = 4 (6)
The subscripts F and I stand for the formal and informal credit
D S market, respectively, q (q ) denotes the credit demand (supply)
quantity, i is the interest rate and a, b, c, d are parameters of
supply and demand functions with a, b, c > 0,d< 0. r- with
0 < r, < 1 is a risk parameter. Informal credit arrangements are
prohibited in many developing countries. Savers will, therefore,
demand a risk premium if they offer their savings in the informal
financial sector. The higher the punishment the lower will be the
credit supply in the informal market and r1 approaches zero. On
the contrary, if the risks in both credit markets are the same,
r- would equal one. r2 > 1 takes account of inefficient credit
rationing in the formal sector. As authorities fix the interest
rate in the formal financial sector (ip) below its equilibrium
value, the supply is limited to q and excess demand exists. Since
banks cannot raise interest rates, they maximize profits by mini-mizing default risks. This procedure cannot assure that those
with the most efficient investment projects and the highest wil-
lingness to pay are satisfied (Cho, 1986) . The credit demand in
the informal financial market will thus be higher for any given
interest rate i than it would have been with efficient alloca-
tion in the formal sector. The less efficient the credit ration-
ing mechanism the higher will r2 be. In the absence of efficiency
losses r_ would assume a value of one. As the authorities in-
fluence r. and r2 through the penalties for informal credit ar-
rangements and the degree of regulation in financial markets, r.
and r- may be thought of as indirect policy parameters of the
model, while i
policy variable.
model, while i being fixed by interest rate ceilings is a direct
In this model financial liberalization will unify both credit
markets resulting in a uniform credit interest rate (i*). In
order to measure the effects of financial liberalization on in-
terest costs of private firms the difference (^i) between average
interest costs per unit of credit after and before deregulation
is calculated. A positive difference implies that the interest






Solving for equilibrium interest rates before and after liberali-
zation, and substituting the results into equation 7 yields:
T) - (a+biT)) - (b-d) (I -i_)q . n
(b-d) (roc + di ) ~
£ X
Equation 8 shows that financial liberalization may increase or
decrease the interest burden for private debtors depending on the
relative size of r., r2 and ip. To evaluate which policies are
conducive for a cost reduction, (8) is partially differentiated
with respect to its policy parameters r., , r_, i,,:q (roc + di_) - (roc + di_)
2
E T^
(b-d) (r2c + di^-P
c(q (roc + di + b(i -i )) - (roc + di_
Z 1 r 1 2 I
_ . 2 (b-d) (roc + diTr
- (a + bi )
It follows from the partial derivatives that financial liberali-
zation tends to decrease average interest costs, if
- the difference between the interest rate ceiling and the equi-
librium interest rate is high, i.e. the lower i_;
r
- the rationing process is rather inefficient, i.e. the higher
If the authorities fix interest rates substantially below their
equilibrium values, the informal financial sector will be rela-
tively large. Due to risk considerations and inefficient credit
rationing interest rates in the informal market are higher than
the uniform rate after deregulation. As the financial reform
reduces interest rates for a large portion of credits, total
interest costs for private firms will diminish. Furthermore,
relative inefficient credit allocation in the formal financial
sector raises the willingness to pay in the informal market.
Therefore, the volume and interest rates increase in the informal
sector. With financial liberalization the reduction in interest
costs is then relatively large.
Equation 9 indicates that an interest rate reform is ambiguous in
its effect on the change in interest costs with respect to r.. . A
high risk associated with severe punishment of informal financial
dealings increases the interest rate for informal credits. How-
ever, with given demand the, size of the informal sector shrinks.
A smaller volume of informal credits means less potential gains
from financial liberalization, while higher interest rates for
informal credits imply a reduction in total interest costs after
deregulation. Which effect dominates, depends on the interestelasticity of the demand for informal credits. With a low elas-
ticity, i.e. small values of d, informal interest rates will rise
but the credit volume remains nearly unchanged. Thus, financial
liberalization will lower total interest costs if r.. is relative-
ly low.
The results disprove Snowden's conclusion that higher interest
rates for bank credits will necessarily increase the average
credit interest rate for firms. Particularly in economies, where
the informal financial market is large as in Peru and the formal
sector's credit allocation rather inefficient, the average in-
terest rate for all firms taken together is likely to decrease
through financial liberalization.
IV. Inflation and Private Investment Behaviour
So far it has been left open how real interest rates are to be
raised. Most theoretical analyses do not differentiate between
increases of nominal interest rates and a reduction of the infla-
2
tion rate . In many financial reforms, for example in Argentina
and Indonesia (Alonso, 1984; Nunnenkamp, 1986), higher real in-
terest rates were achieved by shifting nominal rates upwards
rather than lowering inflation. In a stable economic environment
without distortionary taxes both measures increase real financing
costs for firms and should have identical effects on private
investment . However, high rates of inflation are generally con-
sidered to impede private capital formation irrespective of real
interest rates. Since inflation induced uncertainty is positively
associated with the level of inflation, risk averse investors
According to Susano (1983) in Peru the volume of the informal
credits is three times as large as all credits extended by the
formal financial sector.
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Some authors, however, prefer higher nominal interest rates
because interest rate ceilings are easier to change than in-
flation rates (Moore, Chowdury, 1981).
This statement does not hold in the presence of progressive
taxes. The real tax burden increases in a system based on nomi-
nal values as inflation rises. Lower rates of inflation should
then be relatively more favourable for private investors.will reduce their investment spending as inflation accelerates.
Empirical evidence confirming a positive relationship between the
level of inflation and its volatility is provided by Logue,
Willet (1976) , Blejer (1979) and Fischer (1981). Although vola-
tile inflation rates and uncertainty are not the same thing,
fluctuating inflation rates may be thought of as indicating un-
stable macroeconomic policies and thus an uncertain economic
environment.
In order to evaluate the effects of inflation induced uncer-
tainty on investment behaviour first an aggregate investment
model is formulated. In a second step the model is tested econo-
metrically with Peruvian data.
1. The Model
Models of private investment behaviour generally being used in
theoretical and empirical applications do not allow for a sep-
arate influence of inflation . An exception is the work of
Maloney, Prinzinger, and Ulbrich (1982) who introduced the actual
rate of inflation in a modified quarterly accelerator model of
investment for the United States. They found a negative and sta-
tistically significant relationship between inflation and the
real- change of expenditures for new plants and equipment. They
attribute their results to the interaction of inflation and a
progressive tax structure which reduces the profitability of
funds invested in real capital formation relative to other uses
such as gold or investment in housing.
However, in highly inflationary developing countries tax consid-
erations are less important for investment decisions. Tax rates
are lower while tax evasion is easier and more frequent. In addi-
tion, high rates of inflation reduce the real value of tax obli-
gations if firms succeed in delaying tax payments. Instead, this
paper postulates that any negative impact of inflation on private
fixed investment in developing countries is rather due to the un-
certainty being caused not by high, but by variable inflation
rates.
For an overview and an empirical comparison of various invest-
ment models see Kopcke (1985) and Kutasovic (1983) .10
Possible impacts of uncertainty caused by inflation depend on the
theoretical investment model which is used. Most adequate would
be an investment model including the average real interest rate
for credits and a variable accounting for uncertainty effects of
volatile inflation rates. However, the weighted average interest
cost can not be calculated in Peru, since time series data for
interest rates in the informal financial sector are not avail-
able. Therefore, the following model abstracts from real interest
costs on which lower inflation rates and higher nominal interest
rates have a symmetric impact. It will only account for the un-
certainty following from volatile inflation.
The analysis is based on a flexible accelerator model of private
investment spending, where changes in demand induce firms to
alter their productive capacity. Other factors such as wages are
assumed to have no major independent systematic influence
(Kopcke, 1985, p. 21). Thus, gross investment expenditure (I ) is
determined by the capital stock lagged one period (K. .. ) and the
e 1 expected level of output (Q. ) :
It = a, QJ + a2 K^ (12)
In empirical applications the expected level of output in period
t is proxied by a sum of lagged values of actual output. Forecas-
ting future demand from past levels of output is, however, com-
plicated by volatile inflation rates. Firms face the difficulty
to distinguish price changes which are part of the general infla-
tion from those which indicate excess demand. In addition, infla-
tion induced changes in relative prices reduce the usefulness of
price signals for investment decisions even further (Fischer,
Modigliani, 1978). Moreover, unexpected changes of inflation
rates biases the firm's assessment of potential investment pro-
jects. False projections of future inflation rates may lead to
unprofitable investments, since tax laws, depreciation allowances
With respect to the dependent variable gross investment is pre-
ferred to net investment, since the latter cannot be explained
without considering depreciation losses. Firms generally plan
net additions to the existing capital stock and the replacement
of worn out parts simultaneously (Heil, 1985).11
and accounting rules are based on nominal values .
If firms overestimate future demand they will have built up ex-
cess capacity. The return to capital is then lower than it would
have been with less investment. Profit maximizing firms, there-
fore, seek to avoid excess capacity. Being aware of possible
errors in forecasting future demand due to inflation volatility,
risk averse investors correct their demand projections by a risk
premium (R). The higher the uncertainty the larger will be the









However, reducing inflation will only foster real capital for-
mation, if it can be confirmed that the volatility of inflation
is positively associated with the level of inflation.
2. Empirical Evidence from Peru
After the first oil price shock inflation accelerated in Peru
and, due to inflexible interest rate ceilings, real interest
rates became negative in 1974 (Table 1). In an attempt to stimu-
late financial savings in late 1978 and again in January 1981 the
authorities partly reformed the financial system. Interest rate
ceilings were significantly adjusted upwards in order to account
for the rising rates of inflation and deposits denominated in
US-Dollar were introduced. Since the devaluation of the Sol
against the Dollar roughly compensated the higher rate of infla-
tion in Peru relative to the United States, the Dollar-deposits
were actually indexed deposits meant to stop currency substitu-
tion and capital flight. The inflation rate, however, could not
be brought down. Therefore, increasing inflation rates soon ero-
ded the positive effect of the shifts in interest rate ceilings
on real interest rates, thus favouring the growth of dollar depo-
Halloran and Lanser (1983) show that even inflation adjusted
accounting is not free from inflation biases due to the inher-
ently uncertain nature of inflation forecasts.12
Table 1 - Private Investment, Inflation, and Interest Rates in















































































Average annual change in the cpi. - Standard deviation of
monthly inflation rates, annualized. - Includes comissions,
discounting of credits, quarterly compounding of interest.
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, Memoria, various
issues and unpublished material; own calculations.iiorneK
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sits relative to financial savings in national currency. In 1984,
about 65 p.c. of all quasi-money was held in US-Dollars.
Empirical concepts of inflation volatility generally measure only
partially the uncertainty caused by volatile inflation rates .
Three different measures are used to capture all effects. Simi-
larly to Logue, Willet (1976) and Heitger (1985) the standard
deviation of yearly inflation rates is applied to proxy inflation
volatility. In particular, the standard deviation (PSTD) is cal-
culated from monthly changes in the price level (P) relative to
the price level of the same month of the preceding year:
-
 2 1 i t
1) x 100) -tf ) with ^P = fr I ((^— - 1) x 100) (14)
12
However, as Foster (1978, p. 347) notes, the standard deviation
cannot distinguish between a situation with continuously increas-
ing inflation rates and inflation which rates fluctuate around
their mean. In both cases the standard deviation may be the same,
while the continuously increasing inflation causes less uncer-
tainty as firms can adjust their expectations to the stable
growth of inflation. In • order to correct for this deficiency
Foster (1978) and Blejer (1979) measure uncertainty by the abso-
lute mean of changes in past inflation rates.
A similar variable has been constructed using the absolute dif-
ferences of monthly changes in the price level relative to the
preceding year:
12 P P
PDIFM = — I ((| -^— " -^ | - 1) x 100) (15)
t 12 .. P. . . P- 4. 1
1=1 i,t-l i,t-l
In general absolute and relative measures have to be distingu-
ished. The latter are calculated by normalizing the variability
by the mean level of inflation. This assumes that for example a
deviation of 2 percentage points from the average inflation of
4 per cent has the same consequences as a deviation of 50 per-
centage points from the average inflation rate of 100 per cent.
However, most authors agree that this assumption cannot be su-
stained, since economic decisions are influenced by absolute
deviations.14
Finally, uncertainty results from false projections of future
inflation rates. This type of inflation induced uncertainty is




e - AP | (16)
t t t
It is assumed that individuals form their expectations on the
basis of past levels of actual inflation (adaptive expectations).
Expected inflation is the substituted by actual inflation lagged
one and two periods where the weights decline geometrically and
are constrained to one.
Firstly, it is investigated whether the three measures of infla-
tion variability are positively associated with the level of
inflation. Otherwise policies to lower inflation rates will not
be able to reduce uncertainty. Each measure of uncertainty has
been regressed on the level of inflation using the only data
available, i.e. changes of the consumer price index. All regres-
sions were run over the period 1968 to 1985 with the ordinary-
least-squares-technique .
From Table 2 it can be seen that in the case of Peru the uncer-
tainty of inflation increases unambiguously with the level of















































t-values in parentheses. - Ljung-Box-Q-statistic, level
of significance in parentheses. - Number of observations.
- *Significant at the 10 per cent level. -***Significant at
the 1 per cent level.
Source: BCRP, Memoria, various issues; own calculations.15
inflation irrespective of the uncertainty measure used. In all
regressions the coefficient for the level of inflation is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Having identified the positive association between inflation
volatility and the level of inflation, the negative impact of
inflation induced uncertainty on fixed investment in Peru is
tested econometrically. Starting from equation 9 expected output
and the risk variable (R) have to be specified. In the estimated
equation expected output is proxied by real output lagged one
period. Further lags did not prove to be significant nor did they
improve the coefficient of determination adjusted for the degrees
of freedom. Assuming a linear relationship between the risk vari-
able (R) and uncertainty being caused by inflation, the three
measures of inflation volatility are used to measure inflation
risk.
An initial estimation with annual observations over the period
1968 to 1985 and the ordinary-least-squares-technique revealed
autocorrelation of the residuals. The Durbin-Watson test statis-
tics lay in the inconclusive range. However, the values of the
Ljung-Box-Q-statistic rejected the hypothesis that the first 9 (8
in equation 2) autocorrelation coefficients are white noise. In
order to determine the nature of the autocorrelation process, the
autoregressive parameters have been estimated. On the basis of
these estimates the filtered-least-squares-technique was applied.
The results are shown in Table 3.
According to the adjusted coefficients of determination the over-
all fit of the regressions is reasonably well. The problems of
autocorrelation have been solved. As expected the lagged output
turned out to be the single most important variable in determin-
ing the current level of real private capital formation. The
relatively poor performance of the lagged capital stock may at
least partially be attributed to the lack of reliable capital
stock estimates in Peru. The coefficients for all three variables
measuring inflation induced uncertainty are negative and statis-
tically significant at the one per cent level. The results,16






















































t-values in parentheses. - Ljung-Box-Q-statistic, level of significance in
parentheses. - Number of observations. - *Significant at the 10 per cent level.
- ***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: BCRP (1976); BCRP, Memoria, various issues; INE, Cuentas Nationales del
Peru, various issues; own calculations.
therefore, confirm the proposition that firms reduce fixed in-
vestments if the inflation variability is relatively high.
V. Conclusions
Increases in real interest rates for bank credit are often per-
ceived as offsetting the positive impact of financial liberaliza-
tion on private investment. In the preceding analysis it was
evaluated how higher interest rates on deposits influence the
interest costs for private firms. The discussion showed that
interest rate reforms should be accompanied by deregulative
measures which increase competition in the banking industry.
Resulting gains from lower monopoly profits and more efficient
intermediation can at least partially finance higher deposit
rates. Furthermore, even if bank credits become more expensive,
financing costs of all firms taken together do not necessarily
rise. While the interest burden increases for the previously
privileged borrowers, financing costs decline for those firms
which have been confined to the informal financial sector before
the financial liberalization was implemented. A precondition is,17
however, that banks are willing and able to use their additional
funds to extend credits to borrowers previously being rationed
due to risk considerations. Finally, in order to be able to dis-
criminate between alternative measures to raise , real interest
rates an aggregate investment model has been formulated. It in-
corporates the effects of inflation induced uncertainty on the
business forecasts of risk averse investors. The empirical ana-
lysis with Peruvian data showed that firms reduce their real
capital formation in Peru if domestic inflation variability
rises. In addition, the empirical investigation confirmed a po-
sitive relationship between the level and the variability of
inflation. It can thus be concluded that financial reforms can
stimulate private real capital formation more effectively if
deflationary measures are employed to increase real interest
rates.18
Data Sources
Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP), Cuentas Nationales del
Peru: 1960 - 1974, Lima 1976.
—, Memoria, various issues.
—, Peru: Compendio de Estadisticas Monetarias 1959 - 1984, Lima
1985.
--, Tasas de Interes en Moneda National, Lima 1986, unpublished.
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Cuentas Nacionales del
Peru, various issues.
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